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SUMMARY KEYWORDS
The underlying defects in ADHD (Attention
Deficityperactivity Disorder) are not yet clear.
The current paper tests three existing theories:
State Regulation, Cognitive Deficit, and
Temporal Difference (TD) learning. We present
computational simulations of the Matching
Familiar Figures Task and compare these with
the experimental results reported by Sonuga-
Barke (2002). The TD model contains four
parameters: the learning rate, discounting for
future rewards, brittleness (randomness) of
behavior, and action bias. The results show that
the basic TD model accounts well for control
performance in trials of 5 sec, 10 sec, and 15 sec
duration; but not for the deficits in ADHD
performance at 5 sec and 15 sec. Extending the
TD model to incorporate either a state
regulation deficit, or working memory deficit
and delay in starting trials, can provide a good
account of both control and ADHD results, at
all trial-lengths. We discuss the significance of
the results for theories of ADHD and make
suggestions for future experimentation.
Reprint requests to: Jonathan Williams, Department ofChild
and Adolescent Psychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry, De
Crespigny Park, Denmark Hill, London SE5 8AF, UK; e-mail:
johwilliams@hotmail.com
Financial support received from: tLondon Postgraduate Medical
Deanery; 2Gatsby Charitable Foundation; 3Medical Research
Council.
dual pathway, methylphenidate, computational
cognitive deficit, state regulation, ADHD
INTRODUCTION
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) offers three
subtypes of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD): Predominantly inattentive; Predominantly
hyper-active-impulsive; and Combined, implying
that there are two main causes ofADHD, which can
co-occur. A similar view has been codified as the
"dual pathway model" (Sonuga-Barke, 2002b). The
dual causation view has support from several
sources. One is the finding that ADHD children
with a susceptibility conferring 7-repeat allele ofthe
dopamine D4 receptor gene are remarkably free of
the slow, highly variable response times that
characterize ADHD children lacking that allele
(Swanson et al., 2000a). Furthermore, two quite
different tasks, the Choice-Delay Task (CDT) and
the Stop Signal Task (SST) together form a very
sensitive and specific predictor of the clinical
diagnosis of ADHD. Yet the two measures show
very little correlation between themselves (Solanto
et al., 2001), supporting the independence of the
two causative pathways. The SST is seen as
revealing a component of executive control, which
may be related to general cognitive level; and the
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CDT appears to measure delay aversion, which may
be caused by an abnormality ofreward processing.
Although several etiological factors have been
associated with ADHD, the mechanisms by which
they act are still largely mysterious. However, a
new level of theoretical clarity was achieved
recently with the head-to-head testing of four
explanatory theories of ADHD, using the Matching
Familiar Figures Task (MFFT), in both a severely
affected clinical sample and a mild population
sample matching criteria for combined type
ADHD (Sonuga-Barke, 2002a). In this task, seven
pictures are presented simultaneously on a computer
screen, and the subject has a specified number of
seconds to discover which picture matches the top
one. Each of the four theories (State Regulation
Deficit, (General) Cognitive Deficit, Premature
Task Disengagement, and Ecological Niche) led to
distinct predictions regarding ADHD performance
on the MFFT.
In short, the control groups’ performance
steadily improved as the trials were lengthened from
5 to 10 then to 15 seconds. In comparison, the
ADHD performance was inferior to that of the
controls at 5 see; then equivalent at 10 see, and
again inferior at 15 see (shown below). This effect
was seen in both of the very different samples,
suggesting that we are seeing an important effect.
The data will be used in the current paper as the
basis for assessing the validity of three distinct
computational simulations of decision-making in
ADHD, which can be briefly described as learning-
based, appetite-based, and cognition-based.
Cognitive deficits in ADHD
It is well known that children with ADHD
often suffer from academic impairment (Barkley et
al., 1991; Faraone et al., 1993). Some impairments
persist from preschool to college age (DuPaul et
al., 2001; Heiligenstein et al., 1999).
Neuropsychological deficits have also been
described in ADHD, particularly in tests of selective
attention and frontal function (Doyle et al., 2000;
Grodzinsky and Barkley, 1999; Lockwood et al.,
2001). A reduced activation of various frontal areas
has been described in ADHD children during
Stroop, stop, and motor timing tasks (Bush et al.,
1999; Rubia et al., 1999). Abnormalities of event-
related potentials in a continuous performance task;
of visuomotor perception; and of verbal memory
and learning have also been described (Oie &Rund,
1999; Raggio, 1999; Sunohara et al., 1999).
Subgroups can be particularly affected
(Swanson et al., 2000b). Perhaps half of all
children with ADHD have significant deficits in
motor or perceptual skills, without clear mental
retardation or major neurological disability
(Gillberg, 2003). Dyslexia and other language
problems are seen in about 50% of children with
ADHD (Gilger & Kaplan, 2001) and also often
verbal-performance discrepancy on IQ testing.
It is not clear whether there is a visual search
deficit in ADHD, but it seems likely (Mason et al.,
2003; Malone & Swanson, 1993). More relevant to
MFFT, however, children with ADHD are delayed
in the initiation of a serial visual search and have
deficits in spatial working memory (Karatekin &
Asarnow, 1998; Kempton et al., 1999).
Difficulties after rewards can be expected for
two reasons. First, reward may slow down ADHD
children more than control children (Scheres et al.,
2001). Also, set-shifting problems have been
reported in preschool children with ADHD
(Sonuga-Barke et al., 2003), and these may slow
down the transition from processing reward to
starting the next trial.
Dopamine appetite and state regulation in ADHD
It has been suggested that the underlying cause
ofADHD is a defect in the regulation of activation:
"To counteract a performance decrement, subjects
have to regulate their state: they have to inhibit
activation when stimuli are rapidly presented, and to
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(van der Meere et al., 1999). The proposed
regulation can be described as indirect because a
predictor of need (the stimulus rate) is being used
to regulate activation rather than the level of
activation being used to regulate itself. In the
control of respiration, where regulation has been
well studied, such indirect regulation does exist,
controlled by emotion, body position, movements,
and predicted activity level (Shea, 1996); but
direct control by hypercapnia is simpler and more
important. We have therefore studied direct
regulation as a potentially more parsimonious
explanation for ADHD.
Stimulants like methylphenidate (MPH) block
dopamine transporters (Volkow et al., 1998) and
are used to treat ADHD. in which they improve
academic performance and normalize various neuro-
psychological measures (Elia et al., 1993; Haenlein
& Caul, 1987; Sunohara et al., 1999; Tannock et al.,
1989). Stimulants cause an immediate, unlearned,
and fully reversible reduction in hyperactivity in
ADHD and in control children (Flungund et al.,
1979), leading to the possibility that the children
have an ’appetite’ for dopamine, which can be
satisfied by stimulants.
Dopaminergic systems are activated by reward
but also by various other factors, notably novelty
(Ljungberg et al., 1992; Cloninger, 1987; Horvitz,
2000; Schultz, 1998). Indeed, increased novelty-
seeking is found in ADHD (Downey et al., 1996;
Young et al., 2000), and associations have been
found between a specific allele of the dopamine
D4 receptor and novelty-seeking (Malhotra &
Goldman, 2000). Hyperactivity in ADHD has been
repeatedly found to be ameliorated by novelty
(Iaboni et al., 1995; Felicetti & Julliard, 2000; Sleator
& Ullmann, 1981) and by high reinforcement rates
(Douglas & Parry, 1994; Carlson & Tam.z,.,, 2000).
The Temporal Difference (TD) model ofADHD
This model is primarily concerned with the
behavioral effects of variations in constraints (or
parameters) controlling learning and behavior. The
mapping ofthese parameters to brain structures (as
in Fig. 1) is considered mainly where the
experimental data is strongest, namely with the
dopaminergic neuromodulatory system originating
in the ventral tegmental area (VTA).
The link from the TD learning method to
dopamine function was originally made by
Montague et al. (1996; see also Friston et al.,
1994) to account for data on the activity of
dopamine cells in the VTA and substantia nigra of
monkeys during the learning of an operant
conditioning task (Schultz, 1998). The idea is that
the monkeys are constantly learning to predict
future reinforcement within a trial, and that the
phasic activity of dopaminergic cells signals
mismatches in these predictions. The model
accounts well for a wide variety of data on the
dopamine system in learning (Schultz et al., 1997),
for which evidence is also accumulating in humans
(Fried et al., 2001).
Figure l(a) shows the basic TD model. In it, a
representation of the current state is available in
cortex. The basal ganglia learn to associate these
states, and potential actions, with reinforcements.
The ’action’ (such as inspecting a picture or looking
around the room) that appears likely to produce the
largest reinforcement is in general chosen by the
basal ganglia. The ’predicted reinforcement’ is used
in conjunction with information about immediate
reinforcement to create the ’prediction error’ signal
that, in turn, is used to alter the prediction that will
be made when, in future, the same situation is
encountered again.
The model gradually learns to choose
behaviors that lead to rewards. Details are given in
the Appendix. The basic TD model used in this
paper has already been validated against the
Choice-Delay Task (CDT) (of Sonuga-Barke et al.,
1992; Williams & Dayan, unpublished observations).
However, a weakness of the model is that it does
not provide an obvious account of the immediate
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particularly appropriate for testing the model, as it
is quite different from and considerably more
complicated than the CDT.
The current study presents a computational
simulation of the task used by Sonuga-Barke
(2002a), in order to determine whether state
regulation deficits and/or cognitive impairment
and/or the TD model are able to account for
ADHD performance in the MFFT. Before starting
this work, we expected, based on results described
above, that the TD model needed to be extended to
incorporate a State Regulation deficit.
EXPERIMENTAL
Modeling the MFFT
The challenge here is to simplify the task
sufficiemly to allow it to be programmed, without
losing any aspect that is critical to ADHD. The
task is implemented using a computer program.
Time is simulated as steps, with each time-step
notionally one second. At each time-step, the
model has three options: to inspect the next of six
target pictures to see whether it matches the index
picture; to similarly inspect a randomly chosen
picture; or to do something else (not specified).
The purpose ofthe inspections is for the model
to steadily improve its estimation of the likelihood
that each target picture is a match for the index
picture. After all the time-steps in the trial have
elapsed, the model is interrogated regarding its
choice of best match. It then has two options: to
give its best guess or just to give a random answer.
Complicated cognitive tasks, such as task
acquisition and visual search, are not simulated in
this work. Visual search in particular has been the
subject of a large amount of theoretical and
simulation work, but none has directly addressed
the MFFT.
The model treats quite differently the
situations of inspecting a target picture that
matches the index, versus inspecting a non-match.
We consider the latter first. When choices are
superficially similar (i.e. in difficult trials),
recognizing differences is more likely than
recognizing the identical match. So the program
keeps track ot the current estimated probability for
each of the six target pictures. These start at 1/6.
When a difference is found, the probability of that
picture matching the index drops toward zero, at a
rate determined by the ’learning rate’, and the
probabilities are re-distributed to total 1.
However with very simple pictures (e.g. stick
figures), subjects may be able to tell ’at a glance’
that they have found the right one. Our simulation
allows such recognition in easy trials only.
Without such an ’at a glance’ method, the model
cannot achieve learning as fast as the experimental
controls (though such fast learning could also be
accounted for by controls having a special quick-
scan strategy for short trials.) Note that the
distribution of difficulty levels of the trials affects
performance (see Appendix).
The overall approach just described can be
implemented in many ways. Our program
incorporated temporal difference learning, with its
parameters described below. It also incorporated
parameters suggested by the state regulation and
cognitive deficit theories (also described below),
in such a way that any or all of them could be
disabled, and the effects of the remaining one or
two factors could be investigated in isolation. The
program is written in Matlab (available by email
from the first author).
Applying the Basic Temporal Difference (TD)
Model of learning to the MFFT
The TD model’s behavior is controlled by the
reward size and by four key parameters. In this
context, parameters are numerical measures of
long-term aspects of an organism’s or the model’s
behavior. These are generally unchanging during
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controlled. Although the parameters interact to
determine overall behavior of the model, we study
primarily the simple case of their effects in
isolation.
1. Perceived reward size. This is conceived as
the amount of pleasure elicited by a reward when
it is received. In reality, it will be a nonlinear
function of the objective reward size. We included
this factor to allow the model to account for any
child who tended to experience rewards as less
rewarding than other children, as hypothesized as
one possible cause of ADHD (Blum et al., 2000;
























The Basic Temporal Difference Model
Model B
The Extended Temporal Difference Model.
Differences from Model A are the inclusion of
dopamine appetite and cognitive deficits.
Fig. 1: Models used in this study. (OFC: orbitofrontal cortex; VTA: Ventral Tegmental Area)120 J. WILLIAMS AND E. TAYLOR
see discussion in Solanto et al., 2001). The explicit
reward provided by the experimenter at the end of
successful trials was modeled. We did not model,
however, implicit rewards in the task, such as the
novelty of seeing new pictures, the pleasure of
finding each difference, and the pleasure in
becoming certain ofa match.
2. Reward discounting. The idea here is that a
reward expected in the future is worth less than the
same reward delivered now. Repeatedly in life,
individuals face choices between small, immediate
rewards and delayed large rewards (e.g. in
dieting). We quantify this by multiplying the
reward by a number D (between 0 and 1), at each
time-step. At 9 pm, an immediate reward might be
worth R, but at 8 pm, it is worth RD, and at 7 pm,
it is worth even less, RD2. In our model, ADHD
children have a smaller D, so future reinforce-
ments are discounted more, and delayed rewards
will influence their behavior less than in control
children. Indeed, increased discounting has been
demonstrated in ADHD (Barkley et al., 2001;
Sagvolden et al., 1998); Sagvolden, Aase et al
(2000) proposed that a "shorter and steeper delay
gradient" in ADHD children may lead to the
development of overactivity, increased behavioral
variability, motor impulsiveness, and impaired
sustained attention.
Such a gradient has also been correlated with
impulsive behavior in general psychiatric out-
patients (Crean et al., 2000). Males discount future
rewards more than females, and addicts more than
non-addicts (Wilson & Daly, 2003; Kollins, 2003).
It has been suggested (Williams & Dayan, 2004)
that the discounting rate may to some extent be
learned from the degree of unpredictability in an
individual’s environment; such unpredictability,
however, may be highly context-specific (Aloise &
Miller, 1991). Over a much shorter time course,
discounting can be increased (i.e. D can be reduced)
by exposure to certain pleasurable stimuli (Wilson
& Daly, 2003).
3. Brittleness. The predictability of the model’s
behavior is dependent on three main factors: the
reliability of environmental predictors of reinforce-
ment, the extent to which such lessons have been
learned, and finally brittleness, the extent to which
behavior is based on those learned lessons.
Brittleness being too high allows single learning
experiences to cause sudden changes from one
consistent behavior to another, and a comparative
inability to persist with one behavior in an
unpredictable environment. On the other hand,
brittleness being too low would indicate a
comparative inability to persist with one behavior,
even when the subject has collected adequate
information about reinforcement availability.
In principle, a subject might be more
predictable in some areas of decision-making than
in others. The first is the brittleness of the
decision-making at every time-step. Here the
subject must choose whether to (a) methodically
inspect the next picture in sequence; (b) randomly
choose another picture to inspect; or (c) do
something else. The second is in communication
of the choice at the end of each trial, when the
subject must choose whether to (a) tell the
interviewer the most likely match; or (b) guess.
4. Learning Rate. For consistency with the
computational literature, this term is taken to mean
the maximal rate at which the model is able to alter
its predictions about the environment, rather than,
as would be more natural from a behaviorist
perspective, the rate at which behavior changes. In
the model, prediction error causes changes in
predictions and future actions. If the error signal is
multiplied or divided by a factor, then this has the
same effect as changing the response t that signal,
i.e. the learning rate. Although we model the
learning rate as primarily dependent on various
heritable factors associated with dopamine, the
rate may also reflect intrinsic synaptic factors.
Therefore, the terms ’dopamine multiplier’ and
’learning rate’ are interchangeable.DOPAMINE APPETITE AND COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT IN ADHD 121
There are several lessons learned by subjects
in this task, including (a) the rules of the task;
(b) strategies to use; (c) within an individual trial,
the characteristics of the index picture; and
(d) which pictures are different from the index
picture. Both (a) and (b) were not needed to
explain the data from Sonuga-Barke because the
order of trial lengths was randomly determined for
each subject. For simplicity, we have excluded (c)
and modeled only (d).
A high learning rate is a disadvantage in tasks
for which previous learning can excessively impair
exploration. Such is the case with the Delayed
Response Time Task (DRTT; Williams & Dayan,
2004) and in exploring an environment to find
maximal reward. T his would be relevant to the
MFFT in trials in which a subject erroneously
identified a match, and so then stopped exploring
and did not have a chance to correct his mistake.
This sort of mistake has not been included in the
current simulation.
5. Action Bias. Action bias is a measure of the
child’s preference for action over inaction. Action
bias is greater than zero if the child, for any
reason, has an innate bias to act, such as finding
that action itself reinforcing. Co nversely, action
bias is negative if the child prefers to be inactive.
A non-zero action bias can force the child to make
suboptimal decisions. Such a preference could in
theory be innate or learned or both.
There is little opportunity within the MFFT
task for physical action, and so we have chosen to
define action bias as the tendency to prefer activity
away from the task.
Extensions to the Temporal Difference Model
used in Model B
The TD model was extended to incorporate
state regulation problems and cognitive impairment
to see whether these allow a better fit to the
experimental results. These extensions are shown
in Fig. (b) and are discussed below.
State regulation deficit
We have included dopamine appetite as a
simple example of state regulation. This takes the
form of a ’dopamine level’ that is increased when
reward is received at the end of trials, and then
slowly decays away.
The dopamine appetite must be linked to some
output to complete a regulatory loop. In principle,
appetite could act by increasing or decreasing any
other parameter (or parameters) in the model. The
’gearing’ of this influence is a numeric value that
we can adjust in the simulation. We have simulated
appetite effects on action bias and brittleness,
because these parameters can have immediate and
reversible effects on behavior (see Fig. 1), as
suggested by the immediate result of stimulants. We
have not simulated appetite effects on learning rate
or discount, because the model does not allow these
to have immediate reversible effects.
Cognitive impairment
Performance of the MFFT involves many
subtasks. We have modeled the effect of several
changes that might be expected to accompany
general cognitive impairment. Each is potentially
very complicated, so we have not modeled them in
detail. Instead, we have represented each by a
single number.
1. orking memory. ADHD is often accom-
panied by an impairment in working memory
(Sonuga-Barke et al., 2003). In real subjects,
working memory is important for holding features
of the index picture in mind, for comparison with
the others. Working memory is also important for
holding the ’result’ until it is requested by the
experimenter. We have modeled only this latter
aspect. We model working memory as holding
estimates of the likelihood of each picture matching
the index picture. These estimates are subject to
slight ’blurring’ during each second in which the
model is off-task (see Appendix for details).122 J. WILLIAMS AND E. TAYLOR
We expect that most children are motivated
both by their desire to succeed and by their desire to
please the investigator. After the children become
certain that they have found the right answer, the
question of succeeding disappears, and they may
become interested in something else. We model this
by stopping all activity on the task, once an exact
match has been found. In long trials where the
model finds a match early, the subsequent fading of
its working memory may limit performance.
2. Delay at the start of trials. This delay is the
time used between finishing one trial and starting
the search through the object pictures. The delay
consists of the Post-Reinforcer Pause (PRP) plus
the time used in any initial scan of the index
picture and will include the time needed for set-
shifting, which has been shown to be an area of
deficiency in ADHD (Sonuga-Barke et al., 2003).
During this time, the model is losing opportunities
to collect information about the pictures to match.
Other cognitive factors
a) The ability to search from picture to picture
methodically, avoiding time-wasting repetition.
This ability helps performance in short trials
but not in long trials; in any event, it cannot
account for an absolute decline in performance
in longer trials (results not shown).
b) The ability to find any difference between the
index picture and the picture being inspected.
This ability helps performance at all trial
lengths, but like (a) cannot account for an
absolute decline in performance in longer
trials, so is not shown.
c) Speed of thinking. Many studies have shown
apparently slowed thinking/responses in ADHD
(e.g. Mason et al., 2003; Solanto et al., 2001;
Berman et al., 1999). We have not modeled
this in detail because it cannot provide a
parsimonious account ofthe MFFT differences
between ADHD and controls. Although
stretching of time can be used to account for
the difference at one trial-length, extra factors




1. Perceived reward size. A reduction in
perceived reward size impairs performance across
a wide range oftrial-lengths (results not shown but
very similar to Figure 2(a)). This occurs because,
in the model, a substantial reward increases the
likelihood of (i) at each time-step, staying on-task
and exploring the pictures carefully; and (ii) at the
end of each trial, telling the investigator the
correct answer.
2. Reward discounting. Increased discounting
has minimal effect in short trials; impairs
performance somewhat in longer trials; and has
little effect in very long trials (result not shown).
The deterioration is caused by a reduction in
incentive, during the early part of long trials, for
the individual to work at the task. In very long
trials, this wasted time does not matter. All results
shown use no discounting (i.e. D 1).
3. Brittleness. Groups with low brittleness of
communication have little tendency to tell the
interviewer what they know (this would be quite
different from having an oppositional inclination
to tell him a falsehood). Their recorded
performance is very poor and is little affected by
what they may have learned (results not shown).
Groups with high brittleness ofcommunication, on
the other hand, reliably tell the interviewer what
they know. This allows the interviewer to obtain a
good measure of their ability. All results shown
use a high level of brittleness (6).
4. Learning Rate. A higher learning rate is
generally beneficial in this simulation, as we have
not modeled erroneous identification of matches.
The exception is in cases for which it leads to
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Fig. 2: Simulations of the Matching Familiar Figures Task (MFFT), compared with real data. Each graph shows the means and
standard deviations from Sonuga-Barke (2002) Study 1, redrawn unchanged in every graph as thin lines (solid=control;
dashed=ADHD). Superimposed on this, each graph shows the performance of two simulated groups of children, as thick
lines (solid--model of controls; dashed--model ofADHD). All the simulations use the same values for all parameters, except
for the one or two explicitly manipulated for each figure and shown in the legend boxes, and Model A does not include any
working memory deficit, delay at the start of trials, or state regulation mechanism. Each simulated data point results from
5000 trials. Note that the right ends ofthe x-axes are compressed. (a) Effect on the model of fixed difference in Action Bias.
(b) Effect on the model, of fixed difference in response to reward deficit, increasing Action Bias. (c) Effect on the model, of
fixed difference in response to nonoptimal reward rate, increasing Action Bias. (d) Effect on the model, of reducing the
retentiveness of working memory. (e) Effect on the model, of two fixed differences: start-trial delay and working memory
retentiveness.
Abbreviations: AB Action Bias (see text). One-tail AB: The extent to which non-optimal reward rate increases the Action Bias.
This is "one-tailed" because reduction, but not increase in the reward rate increases Action Bias. Two-tail AB: The extent to
which non-optimal reward rate increases the Action Bias. This is "two-tailed" because increase in the reward rate increases
Action Bias, just as reduction does. Memblur: the extent of blurring of working memory each second (see Appendix).
Startdelay: The number ofseconds not used at the start ofeach trial.124 J. WILLIAMS AND E. TAYLOR
see Discussion). All results shown use a high
learning rate (1).
5. Action bias. Figure 2(a) is shown as an
example of the behavior of Model A, in the
Matching Familiar Figures Task. The figure shows
the effect of increasing the action bias on the
performance of the model. This impairs
performance on the task, as time away from the
task reduces time spent inspecting the pictures.
Summary of results from Model A
Leaming creates a general trend to better
performance in longer trials, seen in the simulations.
This effect succeeds in very roughly approximating
the improvement seen in real ADHD and control
groups (see Fig. 2(a)). The parameters of the TD
model can provide various explanations for the
tendency for ADHD performance to be somewhat
worse than the control group. These explanations
include reductions in perceived reward size,
brittleness, or learning rate, and increases in reward
discounting or action bias.
However, as shown for example in Fig. 2(a),
simple changes to the TD parameters are not able
to account for the absolute deterioration in ADHD
performance seen empirically in long trials.
Model B, with a Difference in State Regulation
between the two groups
We introduced a link from deficient reward
(i.e. below the set-point) to an increased Action
Bias. In practical terms, this reflects the tendency
of a child to become more active when he has not
received much stimulation recently. The effect of
this factor is to selectively impair performance on
longer trials, as expected (Fig. 2(b)).
Figure 2(c) shows a two-tailed version of the
same mechanism. In this case, Action Bias is
increased whenever the reward rate (modeled as
dopamine level) is outside an acceptable range.
This is intended to model previous suggestions
that children could have their performance
impaired both by becoming over-excited at high
rates and disinterested at low rates.
The possibility of a link from reward excess or
deprivation to reduced brittleness (rather than to
action bias) was also briefly explored. In the model,
such a link was much less impairing than the link to
increased Action Bias (result not shown).
Model B, with difference in Cognitive Impairment
between the two groups
1. Working memory. Figure 2(d) shows that
impaired retentiveness of working memory has a
small effect in short trials, but a major effect in
long trials. This is because after the model has
reached its criteria for success in a trial, it tends to
choose non-task activities, during which its
working memory fades. Other simulations (not
shown) showed that having a lower threshold for
certainty, i.e. disengaging from the task before the
answer was well known, preferentially impaired
performance on long trials, as expected.
2. Delay at start of trials. Figure 2(e) shows
the effect of hypothesizing two related differences
between ADHD and control: working memory
retentiveness and start-trial delay. The upper solid
line indicates the performance of the model when
not losing any such search time. The lower solid
line indicates the performance of the model when 3
seconds are lost at the start of every trial. The figure
shows that the effect of such disruption reduces as
trial length is increased, as one would expect.
DISCUSSION
Main results
We have attempted to explain the difference
between ADHD and control performances on a
high-level cognitive task, the MFFT, using the
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TD model is a biologically based multifactorial
theory explained in detail elsewhere (Williams &
Dayan, 2004). We have shown that the TD model
of ADHD is able to provide a fair account of the
performance of both ADHD and control groups on
the MFFT. The model can account for impairment
in ADHD performance in long trials, relative to
controls [Fig. 2(a)] but not the absolute impairment
repeatedly reported (van der Meere et al., 1999;
Dalby et al., 1977; Sonuga-Barke, 2002a). The
model can also account for impaired ADHD
performance in short trials (5 sec) but not for this
impairment being greater than that seen at 10 sec.
We have therefore tested two extensions to the
TD model. The main finding was that both the
State Regulation theory and the Cognitive Deficit
theory are individually able to account for the
short-trial and long-trial deficits in MFFT
performance seen in ADHD children relative to
controls (Figs. 2(c) and 2(e), respectively). T he
model also demonstrated interactions between
these two mechanisms" cognitive abilities created
conditions (such as lack of reward) in which state
regulation mechanisms dominated behavioral
choices; conversely, state regulation mechanisms
(such as the proposed link from reward deficiency
to action bias) could prevent adequate cognitive
exploration ofthe pictures in the trial.
Despite the similarities between (c) and (e) in
Fig. 2, the most straightforward explanations for
short- and long-trial deficits were provided by
cognitive deficits and dopamine appetite,
respectively. It thus seems likely that short-trial
deficits will be preferentially correlated with
execution function deficits; and long-trial deficits
preferentially with delay aversion, stimulant
efficacy, and dopaminergic genes. The need for
two processes rather than one to explain the MFFT
results is supported by the dissociation between
response time and error rate in a GO-NO GO task
(van der Meere et al., 1999). That study showed
the error rate to be minimum at 4-see inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) and worse at 1-see or 8-see.
The response time, however, was considerably
shorter with the 1-see ISI.
Our results are consistent with the truism that
a single psychological test cannot in isolation
distinguish among all the different causes of
psychopathology. Any behavioral result has
several potential causes. For example, using
current data, we cannot separate the effects of
brittleness from that of perceived reward size--or
indeed, from oppositionality.
The computational approach described in this
paper is biologically based, repeatable, and
specified at a lower level than most psychological
theories of ADHD. The model, in having numeric
parameters, is consistent with a widely held view
that the categorical DSM concept of ’ADHD’
should be restated as continua. This aspect may be
useful in attempts to relate behavioral changes
seen in ADHD to underlying genetic and
pharmacological influences.
A major strength of this study is that we have
shown that the TD model, designed for a very
different class of tasks (Choice-Delay Task and
Delayed Reaction Time Task), can make a useful
contribution to the interpretation of experimental
results in much more complicated tasks, such as
MFFT, because even complicated tasks involve
separable aspects of learning and reward processing.
Relation to previous work
The simulations presented here partially
support the conclusion of Sonuga-Barke (2002a)
that a State Regulation deficit is the best single
explanation for ADHD children’s performance on
the modified MFFT reported in their paper. The
difference between ADHD and control children
can be accounted for by a fixed difference in
response to nonoptimal reward rate (Fig. 2(c)).
This is the most parsimonious explanation we
found, as a single parameter govems ADHD
performance deficit in both long and short trials.
The presence of such symmetrical activation of the126 J. WILLIAMS AND E. TAYLOR
Action Bias is readily testable, but is an
unnecessarily strong prediction: For example, state
regulation difficulties may cause the long-trial
deficit while cognitive deficits cause the short-trial
deficit. And although children with Combined type
ADHD were studied, it may well be that the short-
trial and long-trial deficits were independently
distributed.
A major attraction of the State Regulation view
is that it provides a straightforward explanation of
the immediate and reversible effects of stimulants
and novelty. We made a specific interpretation of
the State Regulation hypothesis, namely that humans
attempt to regulate their exposure to dopamine, and
that when their supply is inadequate they attempt to
increase it by increasing their Action Bias. Th is
interpretation is consistent with the MFFT results
(Fig. 2(b-e)) and with the direct effects of reward
and novelty inADHD (references above).
Our simulations also indicate that broadly
defined Cognitive Deficits can also explain the
MFFT data. In particular, impairment specific to
long trials may be caused by working memory
deficits, and impairment specific to short trials
may be caused by slowness in processing a reward
and/or starting trials. In the model, impairment at
all trial durations can be caused by difficulty in
recognizing differences between pictures (result
not shown), and such a cause might be expected
from the differing mean mental ages of the control
and ADHD groups used by Sonuga-Barke (2002a),
namely 10.16 and 8.7 years.
Many children with ADHD are simultaneously
afflicted in multiple ways, including mood
disorders, tic disorders, and oppositionality
(Jensen et al., 2001). A group ofsuch children may
give quite the wrong impression if they are
assumed to have a single underlying pathology.
Dual-Pathway Hypothesis
Our ’single-path’ model involves the same
transmitters, brain areas, and broadly defined
executive dysfunctions (EDF) as the dual-pathway
model of Sonuga-Barke (2002b). The models are
complementary rather than competing, as the TD
model focuses on the roles of dopamine and reward
circuitry, whereas the dual-pathway model focuses
on the roles of individual brain areas and describes
compounding and compensatory processes in some
detail.
The major conceptual difference between the
two models is that whereas the elements ofthe TD
model are working together on every task, the
dual-pathway model has two paths making distinct
contributions to behavior. Even though cortical
areas are structurally and functionally distinct,
however, the status of the suggestion that they
form such well-segregated circuits (Alexander et
al., 1986) is currently uncertain. Mesencephalic
dopamine appears to be released throughout the
striatum and frontal cortex as part of a unified
wave, so it may not have the functional capacity to
send distinct signals (Schultz, 1998). M oreover,
parallel corticostriatal projections converge so
dramatically in the striatum that any segregation of
signals may be lost (Rolls & Treves, 1998).
Higher stimulant doses may have adverse
cognitive effects while maintaining their anti-
impulsivity effect (Tannock et al., 1995; Berman
et al., 1999; Evans et al., 2001; O’Toole et al.,
1997). This observation suggests at least two
pharmacological effects, but whether the
dissociation is between striatum and cortex, state-
regulation and cognition, or even dopamine and
norepinephrine, is not yet clear.
Limitations
The most important criticism of this work is
that the small number of experimental data points
could have been accounted for by an almost
limitless range of physical processes. This problem
is to some extent mitigated by our implementation
of existing theories, rather than new ones invented
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common-sense values for parameters; and by our
adjusting only one of the parameters for each of
the graphs in Fig. 2 (except for (e)). Our prime
goal was not to minimize the number of
parameters in the model, as there will inevitably be
many variables governing performance of a high-
level task even within a control group. Rather, we
aimed to minimize the number of parameter-
changes needed to account for the difference
between ADHD and control children.
We omitted many aspects of MFFT
performance, including frustration, inter-subject
differences, search strategies, and trial-to-trial
improvement (and true learning from temporal
differences). We treated visual recognition and
time simplistically. These simplifications certainly
detract from the realism of the model.
Explanations that are more complicated, however,
are not needed until experimental results show the
current model to be inadequate. The
simplifications make it feasible to produce
rigorous statements about whether simple aspects
of reward processing or cognition are sufficient to
explain the experimental results in ADHD.
Future work
We can also use the incompletely specified
parts of the model to suggest areas for more open-
ended exploration. For example, working memory
deficits are very vague in the current ADHD
literature: memories do not just blur but fade,
transform, merge, disappear, or are superseded.
Dopamine appetite needs to be looked for, not
only by its explanatory power in computational
models of behavioral data but also by studies of
painfully bored animals and children.
The basic TD model was previously validated
against the Choice-Delay Task (of Sonuga-Barke
et al., 1992; see Williams & Dayan, 2004). The
extended TD model has greater explanatory power
than the basic model; the former has now been
validated implicitly on the CDT, as well as
explicitly on the MFFT. We expect that as the TD
model ofADHD reaches maturity, it will become
able to accommodate new paradigms without the
need for extensions like those introduced in this
paper. Then, rather than defining ADHD as a
collection of symptoms or a constellation of rarer
disorders, we will have a model of interactions
among learning, appetites, and cognition, which is
able to account for the multifarious symptoms of
’ADHD’.
The most obvious prediction from a model is
that the structure ofthe model reflects the structure
of reality.
From the interactions of cognitive and state-
regulation mechanisms in the current model, we
predict that performance in the Stop Signal Task
and the Choice Delay Task (Solanto et al., 2001)
will both individually and additively predict
performance in the MFFT. Short-trial performance
seems likely to be impaired in a very wide range of
cognitive deficits, but hyperactivity caused by
increased reward density (perhaps via Action Bias,
as a state-regulation phenomenon), has been
reported in several studies and such children may
be a clinical group requiring distinct treatment.
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APPENDIX
THE TEMPORAL DIFFERENCE (TD) MODEL
In TD learning, using exponential discounting,




where t is the current time in the trial,
r is the future time,
r(r) is the reinforcement delivered at time r, and
7’ is the discount factor.
Angle brackets ( ) indicate that this is averaged
over the random choice of trials and actions.
Montague et al. (1996) used exactly V(t) as the
critic in a form of the actor-critic architecture
(Barto et al., 1983). Here, we use V(t) Q(t,u),
where Q(t,u) depends (Watkins, 1989) on the
action u chosen by the model at time t, where u is
either a or w, for acting or waiting. In our
parameterization,
s(t)=Q(t,u).
The error-signal is used to learn Q(t,u), and
these values are used to control action selection.
The model gradually comes to estimate the
correct value ofO(t,u) for every explored time-
action combination by adjusting its estimates based
on prediction errors"
(t)= r(t)+ Z(t + 1)- V(t)
where r(t) is the actual reinforcement ob.tajned at
time t. The adjustment to the parameter su(t) is
su >s + r/8(t)
alsoif actiOn.V_(i)=u stctually takenr/
at time t, whence . Here, is the learning rate.
At each timestep the model makes a decision
about whether to act or not (i.e. whether to press
the lever) based on the expected sum of future
reinforcements in either case. Some randomness
was added into his behavior to encourage
exploration of explore various behavior patterns,
by using the softmax function
fl(s. (t)+#,,) e
Pt (U) Z
where p(u) is the probability of performing a
particular action u bu is a fixed bias for
particular actions, and ,B is the brittleness.
ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTING THE MFFT
TASK FOR MODEL B
The model includes a vector c, indicating the
current best estimate of the probability that each of
the target pictures matches the index picture.
Difficulty levels of the trials are selected from a
beta distribution with parameters 0.5 and 1, to
restrict the number of difficult trials.
The simulated dopamine level is incremented
by at the end of each trial if the model has
produced the right answer. The level then decays
exponentially, being multiplied at each time-step
by 0.9. For the two-tailed case, with Dopamine set-
point DaSET (0.7), at each time-step in which the
current Dopamine level Da is outside the range
DaSET + 0.3, the effective Action Bias e is
calculated as:
+ 01DaSET-Da
where is the standard action bias for this
experimental group, and 0 is the gearing between
dopamine and Action Bias [shown as "two-tail
AB" in Fig. 2(c)]. Whenever the maximum array
entry exceeds the certainty threshold (0.99), the132 J. WILLIAMS AND E. TAYLOR
model ceases all inspection of pictures in for the
remainder of the trial. During each time-step the
model spends away from the task, c is degraded
according to A (default 0.008) as shown below:
Da(--0
Repeat (for each of 5000 simulated trials, all the same length)




pt(--the number ofthe target picture
thinkdone(-false
Repeat (for each timestep in the trial)
ifthinkdone--true, choose to play; otherwise:
Using softmax, select action from {work systematically; work unsystematically; play },
based on heuristic expected rewards {reward discounted from end of trial; half that; =
ifworking:
choose a picture p to inspect:
(either systematically: previouspicturenumber+l; or unsystematically: random)
ifrand*d<0.25 (i.e. the comparison of difficulty d produces some information)





c <-- (c+A) / Z(c+A)
Da<--Da * 0.9
previouspicturenumber<--p
ifmax(c) corresponds to index picture: Da<--Da+l